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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be 
negative. We argue that voters’ willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties po-
liticize the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter 
concerns. We test this claim by using individual-level data from CSES coupled with unique context 
data on party politicization of corruption in campaigns. Our findings show that higher perceived 
levels of corruption are associated with lower voter turnout but that the negative effect of perceiv-
ing high corruption on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized. 
The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals’ corruption perceptions exert 
a significant negative impact on turnout. By politicizing anti-corruption measures, political parties 
are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting voters’ decision whether to vote or 
not. 
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Introduction 
The negative effects of corruption on a number of policy outcomes are by now well-established 
knowledge (on economy, see Bentzen, 2012; on human well-being, see Holmberg and Rothstein, 
2011 and Charron et al., 2014; and on social and economic inequalities, see Gupta et al. 2002; Jong-
Sung & Khagram, 2005). It is also evident that corruption affects people’s willingness to participate 
in politics. Even though there is no complete consensus on this matter, almost all country compara-
tive studies at hand find that corruption negatively affects citizens’ propensity to turn out to vote in 
elections (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Davis et al., 2004; Chong et al., 2015; Simpser, 2012; 
Stockemer et al., 2013, Sundström and Stockemer, 2015; Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016), as it destroys 
the link and trust between decision makers and the people, which in turn corrodes the political 
system resulting in increasingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen & Tverdova, 
2003, Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; see also Kostadinova, 2009; Warren, 2004: 328). 
 
In this article, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be 
negative. Depending on how politicians handle the issue, the negative effects of corruption may be 
reduced. More specifically, we argue that people’s willingness to participate in elections will increase 
when parties address the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsive-
ness to voter concerns. Party politicization of corruption should thus have a mobilizing effect on 
voters because the awareness of the problem would reasonably increase, as well as the intensity in 
the campaigns and – not least - also by the fact that there are parties that actually promise to do 
something about a serious problem that concerns most voters (see Special Eurobarometer, 2012 & 
2014). The presence of parties that politicize corruption will thus increase the incentives to vote 
among voters who perceive high levels of corruption and moreover increase the likelihood that the 
problems with corruption will be solved or at least dealt with, in contrast to situations where no 
parties raise the issue, leaving voters with the impression that nobody cares. In the latter situation 
the motivation to vote is arguably severely dampened.  
 
No studies have as far as we know of examined the potentially mobilizing effect of party politiciza-
tion of corruption and hence our aim is to fill that gap in the previous literature, by investigating 
whether the negative effects of voters’ perception of corruption on turnout is moderated when 
parties campaign on anti-corruption. By linking party politicization of salient – and sometime ne-
glected – issues to voter mobilization, our study makes novel contributions to the research fields of 
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different political and societal effects of corruption and what accounts to variations in voter turn-
out. 
 
We apply multilevel modeling combining individual-level data and country-level data from 20 coun-
tries from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, country-level data 
from the Quality of Government Data Set and a unique data set on party politicization of the issue 
of corruption in election campaigns. We test two hypotheses and the findings suggest that higher 
perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower turnout (H1) but that there is a positive 
interaction effect, which indicates that that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a prob-
lem on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized (H2). The results 
thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals’ corruption perceptions exert a significant 
negative effect on turnout. In this respect the political parties are important actors. By politicizing 
anti-corruption measures they are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting peo-
ple’s behavior in terms of whether to vote or not.   
 
In the following section we define corruption and discuss previous findings regarding corruption 
and turnout. We then turn to the discussion about how party politicization of corruption should 
affect the relationship between corruption perceptions and voter turnout, i.e. the assumed mecha-
nisms at work, followed by our hypotheses. We then discuss the data and the method applied, after 
which the analysis is presented. The final section concludes the findings and discusses ways to de-
velop the research field further.  
 
Corruption and turnout 
In this article we are primarily interested in political corruption, which has been defined as the 
“manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and 
financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and 
wealth” (quote from Transparency International, 2013). Political corruption is then “the abuse of 
public office for private gains” as well as “all private misdeeds, such as excessive patronage, nepo-
tism, secret party funding, and overtly close ties between politics and business interests” (Stockemer 
et al., 2013:2). Thus, political corruption is rather grand than petty in nature.1 
                                                     
1
 Grand corruption exists at the highest level of government and refers to acts distorting the central functioning of the 
state. Petty corruption exists in the everyday encounter between public officials and citizens and refers to acts where 
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There is a strong consensus among scholars about the severe social and political consequences of 
corruption. The majority of studies on corruption and turnout also confirm these findings, but 
there are also studies reaching the opposite conclusion. Below, we discuss the previous findings. 
 
Presence of corruption is argued to decrease turnout, because “[c]orruption /…/ breaks the link 
between collective decision-making and people’s power to influence collective decisions through 
speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy” (Warren, 2004: 328). Also in material 
terms corruption affects people negatively as the probability of inefficient delivery of what citizens 
are democratically entitled to, such as various public services, increases (Warren, 2004; Stockemer et 
al., 2013). According to this view, corruption thus corrodes the political system resulting in increas-
ingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003; Bauhr and Grimes, 
2014; Davies et al., 2004; see also Kostadinova, 2009). 
 
In a study covering 72 countries between 1984 and 2009, Stockemer et al. (2013) found that coun-
tries with better control of corruption had higher turnout rates. On average, a one point increase in 
corruption control measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index was associated 
with two percentage points higher turnout when controlled for other factors such as compulsory 
voting, importance of the election, degree of proportionality in the electoral systems, size of the 
state, electoral competitiveness and GDP/capita. These findings were supported also in a regional 
level study, where Sundström and Stockemer (2015) analyzed turnout rates in 172 regions in Eu-
rope and found that high quality of government was associated with higher turnout. Thus, there is 
strong evidence that corruption, regardless if measured as control of corruption or as aggregated 
measures of individual’s perceptions of quality of government, has a negative effect on voter turn-
out.  
 
Also on the individual level, studies show that perceptions of electoral fraud have negative conse-
quences for turnout (McCann and Dominquez, 1998; Birch, 2010, Davis et al, 2004). In Mexico, 
McCann and Domiquez found that only the opposition voters were less inclined to vote, whereas 
Simpser (2012) found a more general effect of decreasing turnout at the state level. Moreover, in a 
field experimental study in twelve Mexican municipalities, Chong et al. (2015) showed that infor-
                                                                                                                                                           
public officials abuse their power when citizens try to access public services such as schools, hospitals and police 
departments (Transparency International). 
  6 
mation about corruption significantly decreased actual turnout. In a comparative study of Chile, 
Costa Rica and Mexico, Davies et al. (2014) concluded that perceptions of corruption did not trans-
late into voting for opposition parties, instead perceptions of corruption was associated with non-
voting in all three countries. In a country comparative study, using CSES data, Birch (2010) found 
that voters who perceived the election as fair participated to a higher extent than those who per-
ceived the election as unfair. Bågenholm & Charron (2016) have shown that the most likely re-
sponse from voters - in 24 European countries - to a corruption scandal in their most preferred 
party, is to stay home in the next election. Studying Spanish local elections, Costas-Pérez (2014) 
found that while corruption scandals were associated with lower turnout overall there was a higher 
degree of abstention among independent voters. Strong partisans’, i.e. voters who always support 
the same party, propensity to vote was not affected by corruption scandals. Going beyond malfea-
sance and fraud in the electoral process, Dahlberg & Solevid (2016) showed, when analyzing 26 
countries using CSES data matched with system-level data from the Quality of Government Insti-
tute, that perceptions of corruption in general was associated with lower turnout rates, but only in 
low and medium corrupt countries. In the most corrupt countries, by contrast, no such association 
was found.  
 
Why corruption would increase turnout has been explained by the fact that the expected gain by 
remaining in office is high in contexts where rent-seeking and misuse of public office through for 
example bribe taking and soliciting are prevalent. This in turn leads to increasing campaign spend-
ing for both incumbents and opposition, which mobilize the electorate and make them vote to a 
higher extent. Studies on county and gubernatorial elections in the US find that abuse of public 
office increases voter turnout (Karahan, Coats, and Shughart 2006, 2009 & Escaleras, Calcagno and 
Shughart, 2012). Escalereas et al. (2012) for example found that the higher the number of corrup-
tion convictions of public officials, the higher was the turnout rate in gubernatorial elections 1979-
2005. Another reason for why corruption would increase turnout is found in the clientilisic rela-
tionship between politicians and voters in for example in some Latin American and African coun-
tries. When voters and politicians are connected in a clientlistic relationship or network, the provi-
sion of public goods is handled through these networks rather than through government agencies. 
As a consequence, to cast a vote is associated with personal benefits in terms of more access to 
public goods for the voter (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007). 
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In a study using both experimental design and survey data from the Afrobarometer, Imman & An-
drews (2015) found that Senegalese voters are more prone to vote when they perceive the govern-
ment as corrupt, but only among non-partisan voters. Kostadinova (2009) also finds a weak posi-
tive effect of perceived corruption on turnout in eight post-communist countries using data from 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, but the effect is more or less washed out by the nega-
tive effect of corruption perceptions on political efficacy, which in turn suppress turnout. 
Although previous research points in different directions in terms of the effects of corruption on 
voter turnout, all comparative large N-studies, both on the aggregate level (Stockemer et al., 2013, 
Sundström and Stockemer, 2015) and at the individual level (Birch, 2010, Dahlberg & Solevid, 
2016), point in the same direction: corruption and malpractice tend to decrease voter turnout. We 
find it relevant to explicitly re-test this in a first hypothesis. In short, 
 
H1: The higher perceived level of political corruption among voters, the lower the probability that 
they will vote. 
 
Despite the rich number of studies explaining why turnout differs across voters and countries as 
well as the emerging research on the relationship between corruption and political behavior, no 
studies have to our knowledge examined the mobilizing effects of corruption politicization.2 Hence, 
the main contribution of our study is to examine to what extent this presumed negative relationship 
between corruption and turnout is affected when political parties politicize the issue of corruption 
in election campaigns. The next section develops this argument further. 
 
Politicization of corruption and its assumed impact on turnout 
We consider politicization to occur when an issue is brought to the general knowledge of people 
and in this study party politicization thus refers to situations when political parties are publically 
debating specific issues during an election campaign. Party politicization of corruption can either 
occur when parties raise the issue and suggest ways to come to terms with corruption, without 
making any references to the other parties or politicians or when party representatives accuse one’s 
political antagonists of being corrupt, implicitly meaning that such behavior would come to an end 
                                                     
2
 Davis et al. (2004) analyze the extent to which opposition parties in three Latin American countries manage to mobilize 
dissatisfied voters on corruption issues. However, they only look at the voters perceptions of corruption and voters’ party 
preferences and not if the parties actually politicize the issue of corruption in the electoral campaign.   
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if the electorate votes for the party in question. For party politicization to occur, the issue must 
thus be brought up by political parties during the election campaign.3  
 
But why would an increased focus (politicization) on an issue (corruption), that we know have a 
negative effect on turnout, have a reversed or moderating effect on the relationship between cor-
ruption perceptions and turnout? We argue that it is just because of the increased attention the 
issue of corruption gets when it is politicized which assumingly increases the party responsiveness 
in the eyes of the voters. In the absence of studies that look at the effects of politicization of previ-
ously neglected but important issues on turnout,4 we instead draw on the findings on the effects of 
politicization on party choice, which show that corruption to some extent matters in terms of elec-
toral accountability. From previous studies we know that anti-corruption rhetoric is a successful 
electoral strategy, especially for new parties that previously have not been involved in corruption 
scandals and which thus have more credibility than established ones (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014). 
From the reverse angle, most studies on corruption voting find that corrupt politicians and parties 
are punished by the electorate, but to a somewhat lesser extent than one would expect, given the 
graveness of the issue (see for example de Souza and Moriconi, 2013 for an overview). It has been 
suggested that this is more likely to occur when the incumbents are accused of being corrupt by 
other parties or actually been involved in corruption scandals (Bågenholm, 2013). We thus expect 
that it is only when voters are offered a trustworthy alternative, which seeks to remedy the problem 
of corruption, on an issue which voters find widespread and highly worrying, that the level of par-
ticipation in order to “throw the rascals out” will increase.  
 
By politicizing a previously neglected issue of great importance for the voters implies party respon-
siveness, which we think is one important mechanism at work here. Party responsiveness has main-
ly been used as the dependent variable in relation to voter turnout in previous research (see for 
example Besley & Burgess, 2001; Martin & Claibourn, 2013; Peters & Sanders, 2015), where higher 
turnout is associated with greater responsiveness from the parties, as the number of people who is 
                                                     
3
 Other actors can naturally politicize the issue of corruption. Media is the main source of information when it comes to 
exposing corruption scandals. In order to have a mobilizing effect on turnout, we do however assume that it is party 
politicization that matters, because voters then would be encouraged to support those parties that promise to combat 
corruption, one way or another. If only the media politicizes the issue by for example revealing systematic corrupt deal-
ings among one or several political parties, but with no parties picking up on the story, we would expect, in line with 
previous research, that this would lead to voter apathy and hence lower turnout. In this article, we are only looking at 
party politicization, however. 
4
 As far as that strand of literature looks at the effect on voting behavior, it is party choice that is in focus, not whether it 
has a mobilizing effect and increases voter turnout.  
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thought to monitor the politicians is higher. We argue that this relationship is as likely to work the 
other way around, as the voters’ apathy and resignation is turned into hope when they are presented 
with alternatives who promise to make a change. This is basically along the same lines as the argu-
ment why political efficacy would have a positive impact on turnout, i.e. “the feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process /…/ the feeling that 
political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing 
about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954: 187, quoted in Kittilson & Anderson, 2011, 
see also Kostadinova, 2009). In a context where there is “electoral supply” – in this case credible 
parties that politicize corruption – turnout is likely to increase (see Kittilson & Anderson, 2011) in 
part as a consequence of higher political efficacy.  
 
It is also likely that voters would react similarly to corruption to that of negative campaigning, 
which has been defined as to criticize the “record of the opposing party or parties; questioning the 
judgment, experience and probity of opposing leaders; and generating fear about what the future 
might hold if the opposing party or parties were in power” (Sanders and Norris, 2005: 526). Nega-
tive campaigns have been shown to be mobilizing because they increase voters’ attention and prob-
lem awareness, which increases the interest and feelings of excitement. As a consequence, voters 
perceive a closer electoral race. In addition, negative information might enhance information about 
the candidates. In short, negative campaigns make voters pay more attention to the electoral cam-
paign, which makes them more inclined to vote (Martin, 2004; Brooks, 2006). Being accused of 
criminal activities, which corruption allegation implies, naturally sharpens the conflict and raises the 
stakes between the contestants and that in turn assumingly also increases the media attention and 
thus voter awareness of the problems and the alternatives. 
 
Naturally, we cannot know exactly what sentiments the perceived presence of corruption causes to 
voters, but considering the fact that corruption is a criminal act which violates the norm of impar-
tial and just handling of public matters, in combination with the fact that a majority of EU citizens 
both think it is a widespread phenomenon and a grave problem for their countries (Special Euroba-
rometer, 2012 & 2014), we find it likely that voters who perceive high levels of corruption would be 
keen to correct for the injustices and harm they suffer by voting the rascals out.  
 
There are thus two potentially adversary forces to take into account when hypothesizing about the 
effects of corruption and turnout. On the one hand, the demobilizing effect when perception of 
  10 
corruption is high, in line with hypothesis 1, and on the other hand, the mobilizing counterforce 
when politicization and increased party responsiveness occur. In short, we argue that whether the 
issue of corruption is politicized or not conditions the negative effects of the perception of corrup-
tion on turnout. To be more specific, we test whether the hypothesized negative effect of perceiv-
ing political corruption on turnout is reduced when corruption is politicized in the campaign. Thus, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Perceiving politicians as corrupt decreases turnout less in elections where parties politicize the 
issue of corruption compared to elections where they do not. 
 
Data and measures 
We use data from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) module 2, collected during the period 
2001-2006 in post-election surveys in 34 countries. In addition, we use a subset of a larger dataset 
on politicization of corruption in all 32 European democratic countries covering 215 parliamentary 
elections from 1981 to 2011 (see Bågenholm 2013 and Bågenholm & Charron, 2014).5 For the 
purpose of our study, three non-European elections have also been coded (New Zealand 2002, 
Canada 2004 and Australia 2004). When we merge the CSES data with our politicization dataset, 20 
countries remain. The information on politicization of corruption has been collected primarily from 
election reports in three political science journals: Electoral Studies (ES), West European Politics 
(WEP) and the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR). The goal has been to have every 
election covered by at least two of these journals and, in the case there has been only one report 
available, to look at additional sources, such as European Parties Elections & Referendums Net-
work (EPERN), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and The Economist. The election reports have a 
common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, 
the results and the outcome), even though the contents and extent of the sections can vary some-
what. There is naturally a potential risk that the issue of anti-corruption has been under reported, 
especially if the issue was peripheral in the campaign and/or advocated by smaller parties. Howev-
er, we consider the risk of missing cases in which corruption has been a prominent feature of the 
                                                     
5
 The dataset on politicization of corruption can be requested from the authors. 
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campaign to be rather small, i.e. the frequency of the issue is hardly overstated. The use of several 
sources for each election further diminishes that risk.6 
 
The electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, 
i.e. referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations 
against other parties during the election campaign. While the word “corruption” has obviously been 
the main indicator of whether the issue has been present in the election campaign or not, in order 
to be coded as an instance of politicization, the “sender” must also be an identified political party, 
and not for example the media or any other actor. The coding was unproblematic in most cases 
and, in those reports where some ambiguities arose, the complementary sources were used to clari-
fy any uncertainties. There are a few instances, however, where the word “corruption” was not used 
in the reports, but where it nevertheless was obvious that politicization of the issue is at hand, e.g. 
in some cases where scandals involving politicians taking bribes are described - but without explicit-
ly stating that it is a “corruption scandal” - and where parties have been said to “take advantage” of 
that situation or having “attacked” their opponents for that reason, but again without the explicit 
use of the word corruption. In order not to miss these instances, it has therefore been important 
that the whole reports have been read thoroughly, rather than using the search functions to find the 
relevant sections.  
 
Because of missing data for some of our key variables and due to the fact that we have restricted 
our analysis to countries that are categorized as Free according to the Freedom House index, our 
analyses are based on a total of 20 countries.7 
 
Turnout 
The dependent variable of turnout measures whether the respondent voted or not in the last na-
tional election. As with all survey questions on electoral participation, respondents consistently 
over-report their turnout rates as a result of memory flaws or social desirability bias (Belli et al., 
1999; Dahlberg & Persson, 2014; Granberg & Holmberg, 1991; Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). In 
                                                     
6
 Some studies use data from the Comparative Manifesto project to estimate how much an issue is highlighted in an 
election campaign. We find this strategy problematic because it cannot be assumed that issues in manifestoes actually 
are debated during the campaign, which in the case of the specific issue of corruption (see Bågenholm, 2009). If the 
issue is not publically debated, we do not consider it as politicized, as most voters do not read the party manifestoes. 
7
Freedom in the World. Freedom House’s annual global survey of political rights and civil liber-
ties (www.freedomhouse.org). 
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our country sample, self-reported turnout is considerably higher than the official turnout in all 
countries and differences are particularly large (> 20 percentage points) in Canada, Romania, Ire-
land and Hungary (see figure 1 in Appendix 2). Since validated turnout measures do not exist at the 
individual level in the CSES data, we have constructed a weight variable at the system level based 
on the official turnout rates, which is used in the analysis in order to correct for the overestimated 
turnout levels within the countries included in the analysis.  
 
Corruption perceptions 
As mentioned, several previous studies estimating corruption effects on electoral turnout is carried 
out as aggregated country level studies since few data sets include both measures of individuals’ 
corruption assessments and turnout measures. The CSES module 2, is one of few datasets that 
both includes individual turnout and a survey item measuring perceptions of political corruption. 
The question reads: How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in 
[country]: very widespread (coded as 4 in our analyses), quite widespread (3), not very widespread (2), it hardly hap-
pens at all (1)? Although political corruption is one of many ways to ask about corruption in a socie-
ty, the above questions fits nicely with the definition of corruption we discussed earlier. Still, the 
survey question does not capture respondents’ personal experience of corruption which could have 
been a valid measure as well.8 
 
To validate our corruption measure, we have matched voters’ corruption perceptions with corrup-
tion measures at the aggregate level. As already addressed in the theoretical section, we can expect 
some correlation between citizens’ perceptions of corruption and global corruption as assessed by 
Transparency International (TI). Such a correlation at the aggregate level also indicates validity in 
our measures. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 illustrates the correlation between the country means in cor-
ruption perceptions based on the CSES data versus the mean placement in Transparency Interna-
tional's corruption perception index (both variables are here rescaled ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 
is equivalent to a high degree of corruption). There is a strong relationship between the two (b=.55, 
R2=.81), which simply means that, when corruption is widespread in a global sense according to TI, 
citizens also tend to judge political corruption as being widespread and vice versa. However, there 
are some exceptions to this rule, for example in Germany and Canada, where there is a difference 
                                                     
8
 The data can be sought from CSES Secretariat, www.cses.org, Centre for Political Studies. Institute for Social Re-
search. The University of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded from: www.umich.edu/~cses. 
  13 
between how TI judges the presence of corruption vis à vis how citizens perceive the same phe-
nomenon.9 
 
Corruption politicization 
The politicization variable is coded as a dummy variable where 1 equals that corruption is politi-
cized in the election and 0 that no such politicization took place. As mentioned earlier, the electoral 
reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, i.e. referring 
to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations against other 
parties during the election campaign. Table 1 displays whether or not politicization of corruption 
took place in the election campaign among the 20 parliamentary democracies included in this study. 
Evidently, corruption politicization is more common in countries with less control of corruption. 
The 2002 Irish election and the 2004 Canadian election are exceptions to this pattern. 
 
TABLE 1, POLITICIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
Corruption politicized in the election campaign Corruption not politicized in the election campaign 
Bulgaria 2001 Australia 2004 
Canada 2004 Belgium 2003 
Czech Republic 2002 Finland 2003 
Ireland 2002 Germany 2002 
Italy 2006 United Kingdom 2005 
Hungary 2002 Iceland 2003 
Poland 2001 Netherlands 2002 
Romania 2004 New Zealand 2002 
 Norway 2001 
 Portugal 2002/2005 
 Spain 2004 
 Sweden 2002 
 
Control variables 
Aside from corruption assessments, the remaining independent variables at the individual level are 
chosen to represent the most important explanations as to why turnout differs between voters. 
Among the individual level explanations, the most commonly used is the Civic Voluntarism Model 
(Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) distinguishing between voters’ a) resources, such as socioeco-
nomic position and cognitive capability, b) motivation, for example interest in politics, and c) mobi-
lization, that is, to what extent the voter is part of a recruiting network. In short, studies investigat-
                                                     
9
 As illustrated in figure 3 in Appendix 2, there is both notable between-country variation in citizens’ corruption percep-
tions as well as large within-country variation in terms of standard deviations from the mean. 
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ing individual level explanations to turnout conclude that citizens with more economic and cogni-
tive resources have a higher propensity to participate than citizens with fewer resources (Rosen-
stone & Hansen, 1993, Franklin, 2004, Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). In addition, another 
important conclusion is that citizens with more socioeconomic resources tend to have more cogni-
tive skills and thus tend to be more motivated and are more likely to being asked to participate 
which altogether lead to a higher turnout (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). 
 
When we shift our attention to differences across individuals’ propensity to turnout to differences 
in turnout across countries, the relative importance of individual level explanations to turnout di-
minishes. Instead, institutional explanations, such as features of the electoral system, are more im-
portant since they more directly modify the individual’s costs of voting (Franklin, 2004). Of the 
institutional level explanations, countries with compulsory voting and PR systems have higher turn-
out. In addition, a higher voting age and facilities for postal voting and automatic registration also 
lower the cost of voting and leads to higher turnout (for an overview, see Blais, 2006).  
 
All our individual level variables are based on the original variables included in the CSES module 
except for age, which is coded into seven categories. Education is based on the original eight cate-
gories. Marital status is coded as a dummy where 1 equals married or cohabitant and single or di-
vorced equals 0. Income has four categories and is based on percentile values. Employment and 
party identification are also entered as dichotomous variables. Political knowledge is constructed as 
an additive index based on three information items included in the data (see the Appendix 1 for 
detailed coding instructions). To have voted in prior election and whether one was voting for an 
incumbent party or not in the prior election both enter as dichotomous variables. Unfortunately, 
social trust, being one of the key explanations to corruption perceptions, is not included as a ques-
tion in CSES. However, following Kostadinova (2009), we are controlling for internal and external 
political efficacy, measured as people’s belief in the system to be responsive to their needs as well as 
people’s beliefs in themselves regarding their ability to change the political system (see Appendix 1 
for summary statistics and additional information of the variables).  
 
Regarding the system level variables, there are several factors that ideally should be accounted for 
according to prior research. When comparing turnout across countries, variables associated with 
the electoral system, such as proportionality, effective number of parties and compulsory voting are 
important to control for (Franklin, 2004; Blais, 2006). Population size, unicameralism and closeness 
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in an election are three other factors that have been suggested to have an indirect effect on turnout. 
Regarding closeness, the idea is simply that if the race is expected to be close, the political parties 
and their representatives will increase their efforts to mobilize the voters (Franklin, 2004).  
 
 
Corruption, politicization and turnout 
Table 2 presents a multilevel regression model predicting voter turnout. Model 1 contains the cor-
ruption assessment variable together with the individual level variables known to affect turnout. In 
accordance with our first hypothesis, perceiving corruption as a problem is associated with lower 
electoral participation. Thus, for each step on the corruption assessment variable (which varies 
from “hardly happens” to “very widespread”), turnout decreases significantly with -.369. More 
substantially this means that under control for all other variables at the individual level, the proba-
bility of voting is .92 when corruption is seen as a minor problem while the predicted probability of 
voting is .82 when corruption is perceived as a major problem. Hence, the effect is small but signif-
icantly different from zero.  Although the control variables are of less interest here, we find signifi-
cant effects of almost all individual level variables indicating that citizens who are female, older, 
highly educated, married, have higher income, high political knowledge, and identify themselves 
with a political party, have higher internal and external political efficacy have higher turnout com-
pared to citizens who are male, younger, lower educated, single, have lower income, lower political 
knowledge, no party identification and lower efficacy. The strongest predictor of turnout in model 
1 is by far to have voted in prior elections, which is not surprising since it for long has been argued 
that voting to a large extent is a process of socialization. All these variables are related to the stand-
ard explanations when it comes to predicting turnout. In this case this confirms that our data is 
valid and perhaps more importantly, that our main independent variable, corruption perceptions, is 
a valid additional explanatory factor.  
 
Since we are restricted to a sample of 20 countries we cannot include all the suggested system level 
variables in the same model. In order to determine which variables that are of greatest importance 
to include, we have conducted a set of regression analyses where we incorporate all our variables 
pertaining to the individual level together with the politicization variable jointly with each of the 
system-related variables in subsequent order (i.e. one system control variable at a time). In this pro-
cedure the decision rule has been to only include variables that a) have a significant impact on the 
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model by themselves, or b) have a substantial impact on the effect politicization of corruption (see 
Appendix 1 for coding rules, data sources and summary statistics of all system level variables and 
see table 1 in Appendix 3 for regression output).  
 
These analyses left us with three variables for inclusion: our main independent variable, politiciza-
tion of corruption, the global perception index from Transparency International and compulsory 
voting. However, the global corruption perception index and politicization of corruption are two 
variables that are highly correlated (r = .78), simply because fewer parties are trying to politicize on 
corruption where corruption is less of a problem. Nevertheless this means that if both variables are 
included simultaneously the effect from both variables cancels out due to multicollinearity. If we 
instead include the two variables one at a time in separate models, both factors exert a significant 
negative impact on turnout. Since we don't have enough data to include them both at the same time 
we have decided to primarily use politicization of corruption. Model 2 estimates the effect of the 
above-mentioned system level variable, compulsory voting, known to explain differences in turnout 
across countries as well as the effect of our variable measuring politicization of corruption. The 
result indicates a positive and significant turnout effect of compulsory voting (1.695) and a negative 
and significant impact of the politicization variable on turnout (-.974).  
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TABLE 2, CORRUPTION AND TURNOUT (UNSTANDARDIZED LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS, RANDOM 
EFFECTS MODELS) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Corruption assessments  -.369*** 
 
-.360*** -.473*** 
 
(.092) 
 
(.092) (.108) 
Sex .076 
 
.076 .078* 
 
(.047) 
 
(.047) (.047) 
Age .490*** 
 
.491*** .493*** 
 
(.093) 
 
(.093) (.093) 
Education .404*** 
 
.402*** .398*** 
 
(.116) 
 
(.116) (.116) 
Marital status .180*** 
 
.180*** .179*** 
 
(.051) 
 
(.051) (.051) 
Employed .064 
 
.064 .065 
 
(.088) 
 
(.088) (.088) 
Income .296*** 
 
.297*** .296*** 
 
(.088) 
 
(.088) (.088) 
Political knowledge .907*** 
 
.908*** .904*** 
 
(.085) 
 
(.085) (.085) 
Party identification .664*** 
 
.663*** .664*** 
 
(.051) 
 
(.051) (.051) 
Voted in prior election 1.956*** 
 
1.954*** 1.953*** 
 
(.059) 
 
(.059) (.059) 
Voted for incumbent in prior election -.201*** 
 
-.200*** -.199*** 
 
(.062) 
 
(.062) (.062) 
Internal efficacy  -.470*** 
 
-.471*** -.471*** 
 
(.077) 
 
(.077) (.077) 
External efficacy .647*** 
 
.648*** .649*** 
 
(.080) 
 
(.080) (.080) 
System level 
    
Compulsory voting 
 
1.695** 1.255 1.267 
  
(.816) (.810) (.816) 
Corruption politicized 
 
-.974** -.915** -.941** 
  
(.453) (.451) (.454) 
Corr. assessment.*Corr. politicized 
   
.419** 
    
(.207) 
Constant -1.094*** 2.383*** -.958*** -.973*** 
 
(.289) (.254) (.294) (.295) 
Std.Dev. Intercept lev 2. 1.009 .81 .802 .809 
Roh .236 .166 .164 .166 
Log Likelihood -6451.0827 -7952.6035 -6447.7926 -6445.7474 
PRE 7.25 .00 7.51 7.54 
Observations 26.650 26.650 26.650 26.650 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 
Comment: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. For 
Portugal two election studies are included in the CSES module 2, which are for the elections of 2002 and 2005, but the results 
are unaffected by the time aspect. Turnout is weighted according to actual turnout rates in respective country. PRE is proportional 
reduction in error. It is the percentage reduction of the total error in prediction, knowing the model versus not knowing the model.  
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In model 3, the individual level variables and the system level variables are estimated at the same 
time as an additional control and the main finding is that very little happens. The negative impact of 
individual perceptions of corruption remains and thus, H1 is confirmed.10 It should be mentioned 
that the result also is stable and robust under the inclusion of additional control variables on the 
system level such as unicameralism, the effective number of parliamentary parties, global corruption 
and aggregated turnout. Although the direct effect of politicization is still negative, the main ques-
tion is how the presence corruption politicization affects the relationship between corruption per-
ceptions and voter turnout.  
 
In model 4, we therefore include an interaction term between individual corruption assessments 
and the corruption politicization variable. In line with our second hypothesis, we obtain a positive 
and significant effect of .419. In terms of predicted probabilities this means that when corruption is 
perceived as being widespread but corruption is not politicized by a party, the probability of voting 
is .74. However, when corruption is politicized the probability of voting among those perceiving 
corruption to be widespread is .81. This result is good news since it implies that the initial negative 
and significant effect of corruption perceptions on individual turnout is disappearing when corrup-
tion is politicized by a party. However, the politicization of corruption does also mean that turnout 
is decreasing somewhat among those who do not perceive corruption to be a major problem, alt-
hough not significantly so. The explanation for this is found in the fact that turnout is on average 
lower in countries where corruption is politicized (the average value of turnout is .77 when corrup-
tion is not politicized compared to .61 when it is being politicized). More importantly though is the 
fact that there is not a significant difference in turnout due to individual differences in perceptions 
of corruption when corruption is being politicized by a political party. These results are also robust 
when we include system measures of global corruption and aggregated turnout into the equation. 
The only difference is that none of the system related variables reach statistical significance when 
they all are included at the same time (the average correlation between compulsory voting, aggre-
gated turnout, global corruption and politicization of corruption is roughly .60). 
 
To further understand the interaction effect, figure 1 displays the marginal effect of voters’ corrup-
tion assessments at different levels of politicization of corruption. The graph illustrates the average 
                                                     
10
 Politicization of corruption has also been operationalized and measured based on a different data source (not includ-
ed in table), which is the proportion of sentences in party manifestos related to corruption. The results in model 4 is 
confirmed also when this alternative operationalization is used and the interaction effect is in this case (.375). 
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marginal effects on the probability to vote of perceiving political corruption when corruption is not 
politicized compared to when it is.  
 
FIGURE 1, INTERACTION EFFECT, CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS AND POLITICIZATION OF COR-
RUPTION ON TURNOUT (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES) 
 
Comment: Corruption assessments=1 = It hardly happens at all. Corruption assessments= 4 = Very widespread. When 
comparing differences in means, confidence intervals of 84 percent should be used instead of the traditional 95 percent level since 
CI:s of 84 percent corresponds to p=.05 (Julious 2004). 
 
As shown in the graph, the negative effect of corruption assessments on turnout disappears when 
corruption is politicized in the electoral campaign. Perceiving political corruption as a problem is 
associated with lower turnout only in countries with no politicization of the corruption issue. Thus, 
politicization of corruption in the election campaign removes the negative effect of perceiving po-
litical corruption on turnout.  
 
Conclusions 
The general aim of this article has been to contribute on the emerging research examining how the 
presence and perceptions of corruption affect voters’ political behavior. Although previous studies 
reach different conclusions, the majority of the studies referred show evidence that perceiving cor-
ruption as a problem is associated with a lower propensity to vote. Departing from this negative 
relationship, the more specific aim of our study has been to test if the politicization of corruption 
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by political parties in the election campaign affects the negative relationship between corruption 
and turnout. Being a first test of the politicization hypothesis, we used a measure of politicization 
defined in terms of whether a political party brought up corruption/clean government issues 
and/or accused their opponents for being corrupt in the election campaign. 
 
In sum, the results presented indicate support for our first hypothesis, that is, levels of electoral 
participation in the 20 parliamentary democracies studied are lower when political corruption is 
perceived as widespread. However, and in line with our second hypothesis, party politicization of 
corruption actually moderates this general negative impact of corruption. The positive interaction 
effect indicates that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced 
in an election context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is 
not politicized, the individual corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on voting 
(i.e. if a voter perceives that there is corruption at the system level but no party is politicizing cor-
ruption, the probability to vote is significantly lower). On the other hand, if corruption is politicized 
by a party, there is no significant effect of individual corruption perceptions on voting (i.e. even if a 
voter perceives that corruption is occurring on a system level, it does not affect the probability to 
vote). Hence, the politicization of corruption on the system level reduces the negative effect of 
individual corruption perceptions on turnout.  
 
Furthermore, our results suggest that political politicization of a neglected issue of great concern to 
the voters may have a mobilizing effect. Not only does politicization of corruption impact vote 
choice – as previous research has found – but also the extent to which people turn out to vote in 
the first place. We argue this happens because voters perceive both the political parties to be more 
responsive and also the efficacy to be stronger in such situations, i.e. a sense that the parties both 
have the willingness and intention to curb corruption. These results thus indicate that the relation-
ship between responsiveness and turnout can go both ways. Not only do elected representatives 
enhance their responsiveness as a consequence of high turnout as suggested in previous studies, it 
is also the case that by focusing on neglected issues, the parties can affect the extent of voting in-
tentions. 
 
This is good news for the functioning of electoral accountability, which is one of the cornerstones 
of representative democracy. Needless to say, the presence of corruption is never a good thing nor 
is the perception of widespread corruption. But given that it is the case, it is arguably more condu-
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cive for enhancing mobilization to address the issue and suggest ways to remedy the problem than 
to avoid talking about it at all. It is when the issue is neglected or purposely swept under the carpet, 
that voters get demobilized and apathetic. Whether the parties actually will effectively combat cor-
ruption once in office is a different matter and whether they exploit the issue of corruption or not 
both affects voting behavior and party strategies in subsequent elections. Politicization of corrup-
tion can only be bad if there are no real intentions and just a strategy to win support in the short 
run. In such cases, voters’ trust and engagement will most likely decrease and apathy will prevail.  
 
To take this strand of research to the next step there are a couple of shortcomings which would 
preferably be remedied. One is that we cannot make use of the time series element in the politiciza-
tion data since the comparative voter studies at hand are cross-sectional. If we were to expand our 
study in time, we would have to abandon the individual voter perspective, and the micro-macro 
approach used here and work with aggregated data only. Despite the downside of using aggregated 
data only, such a design would learn us more about how the over-time fluctuations in degree of 
politicization of corruption affect turnout. Furthermore, in an ideal situation the relationship be-
tween individual level assessments and party politicization of corruption should also be more thor-
oughly elaborated with regard to levels of global corruption and aggregated turnout but today this 
cannot be conducted in a satisfactorily manner due to limitations in data availability. A further elab-
oration of the current study would moreover be to look into more detail to the extent corruption is 
politicized and – if data holds – test if it matters whether corruption is politicized through scandals 
and allegations or more as a political issue, such as a pledge to combat corruption as well as differ-
entiate between credible and non-credible corruption fighters, by for example take the parties pre-
vious track record, i.e. involvement in corruption scandals, into consideration.  
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Appenix 1: Coding of variables 
 
Individual level variables 
Voted (B3004_1): "In current election, did respondent cast a ballot?" (Voted=0) (Did not vote=1). 
Corruption assessments (B3044): " How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is 
amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it 
hardly happens at all?" (Very widespread=4) (Quite widespread=3) (Not very widespread=2) (It 
hardly happens at all=1). The variable is centered around the mean in our analyses. 
Sex (B2002): coded as (Male=1) (Female=2) 
Age of respondent (B2001): coded as: (16/21=1) (22/30=2) (31/40=3) (41/50=4) (51/60=5) 
(61/70=6) (71/max=7) 
Education (B2003): (Elementary school =1) (High school  (2/3)=2) (Upper Secondary (4/6)=3) 
(University (7/8)=4). Original CSES coding: 1=None, 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Primary com-
pleted; 4=Incomplete secondary; 5=Secondary completed; 6=post-secondary trade/vocational 
school; 7=University undergraduate degree incomplete; 8= University undergraduate degree 
completed.) 
Maritial Status (B2004): (0= Widowed, Divorced and Single) (1=Married or Cohabitant) 
Employment (B2010): (5=0) (1/4=1) (6/12=1) (97/max=.) Original CSES coding: 1= Employed - 
full-time (32+ hours weekly); 2=Employed - part-time (15-32 hours weekly) 3=Employed less 
than 15 hours; 4=Helping family member; 5=Unemployed; 6=Student; 7=Retired; 
8=Housewife/home duties; 9=Permanently disabled, 10=others (not in labor force). 
Income (B2020): Original CSES coding employed, (1=Lowest Household Income to 5=Highest 
Household Income) 
Political Knowledge: Additive index based on Political information items 1-3 (B3047_1; B3047_2; 
B3047_3 ) coded as: (Correct=1) (Incorrect=0). 
Party identification (B3028): "Are you close to any political party?" (No=0) (Yes=1) 
I control for external 
Internal political efficacy (B3013): “Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say 
that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE 
means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a differ-
ence who is in power), where would you place yourself? (1=It makes a difference who is in 
power, 5= It doesn’t make a difference who is in power). 
External political efficacy (B3014): Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make 
any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to 
what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a dif-
ference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you 
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place yourself? (1= Who people vote for won’t make a difference, 5= Who people vote for can 
make a difference). 
System level variables 
Politicization of corruption. Coded 1 if corruption is brought up by a political party as an election issue 
or if corruption allegations against parties/representatives/incumbents occurred in the election 
campaign. Coded 0 if corruption is not mentioned in the election reports. 
Global corruption perception is based on Transparency Internationals corruption perception index 
(CPI). The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse 
of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in 
line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-
taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between admin-
istrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corrup-
tion as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). (see Transparency International 2012). The variable is re-
versed and centered around the mean in our some of our analyses. 
Proportional Electoral System: is taken from “Database of Political Institutions” (Beck et al 2001) 
Compulsory voting (0=non-compulsory Voting)  (1=Compulsory voting). 
Effective Number of Electoral Parties: is measured as the effective number of parliamentary parties 
calculated by the vote-shares using the index of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Her-
findahl’s index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as that:  
n
i i
pH
1
2
 where pi is 
the population proportion for group i of votes and where 1/H then is the effective number of 
parties.  
GPD growth/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled 
by Teorell et. al. (2013). 
GPD/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled by 
Teorell et. al. (2013). 
Population (thousand) is taken from Maddison (2003) 
Electoral Closeness in an election is here computed as 1- the difference in vote-shares of the two larg-
est parties in each election.  
Unicameralism is coded as a dummy based on information from Gerring et al (2005) and Johnson & 
Wallack (2006). 
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TABLE 1, SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
 
Voted Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
overall   .862 .345 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.094 .603 .984 n =      20 
within 
 
.333 -.122 1.259 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Corruption assessments 
     overall   .596 .302 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.188 .343 .855 n =      20 
within 
 
.247 -.259 1.252 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Sex 
      overall   1.506 .500 1.000 2.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.034 1.466 1.606 n =      20 
within 
 
.499 .900 2.040 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Age 
     overall   .530 .275 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.039 .438 .597 n =      20 
within 
 
.273 -.067 1.091 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Education 
     overall   .585 .247 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.075 .476 .745 n =      20 
within 
 
.235 -.159 1.109 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Marital status 
     overall .678 .467 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.090 .568 1.000 n =      20 
within 
 
.459 -.072 1.109 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Employed 
     overall .946 .227 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.040 .815 .987 n =      20 
within 
 
.223 -.041 1.130 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Income 
     overall .489 .328 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.036 .432 .573 n =      20 
within 
 
.327 -.084 1.057 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Political knowledge 
     overall .583 .299 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.104 .387 .793 n =      20 
within 
 
.281 -.210 1.196 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Party identification 
     overall .481 .500 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.170 .303 .998 n =      20 
within 
 
.478 -.517 1.178 T-bar = 1154.75 
      Voted in prior election 
     overall .853 .354 .000 1.000 N =   26650 
  30 
between 
 
.077 .737 .977 n =      20 
within 
 
.348 -.124 1.116 T bar =  1332.5 
      Voted for incumbent in prior election 
    overall .339 .473 .000 1.000 N =   26650 
between 
 
.162 .000 .555 n =      20 
within 
 
.449 -.217 1.277 T bar =  1332.5 
      internal efficacy  
     overall .335 .321 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.097 .160 .501 n =      20 
within 
 
.308 -.166 1.175 T-bar = 1154.75 
      external efficacy 
     overall .690 .295 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.084 .559 .823 n =      20 
within 
 
.285 -.133 1.131 T-bar = 1154.75 
      global corruption perception index (ti)  
    overall -.255 .260 -.587 .332 N =   23095 
between 
 
.303 -.587 .332 n =      20 
within 
 
.004 -.263 -.236 T-bar = 1154.75 
      compulsory voting 
     overall .082 .248 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.245 .000 1.000 n =      20 
within 
 
.000 .082 .082 T-bar = 1154.75 
      corruption politicized 
     overall .296 .457 .000 1.000 N =   23095 
between 
 
.489 .000 1.000 n =      20 
within   .000 .296 .296 T-bar = 1154.75 
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FIGURE 1, SELF-REPORTED TURNOUT (CSES) COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL TURNOUT (R=.67) 
 
Sources: CSES module 2; www.parties-and-elections.eu; www.aec.gov.ac; www.elections.ca and.electionresults.govt.nz.  
Comment: For Portugal, the graph reports the mean turnout (both self-reported and official) of two elections. The correlation 
between official and self-reported turnout in CSES is .67. 
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FIGURE 2, CORRELATION BETWEEN AGGREGATED COUNTRY MEANS OF CORRUPTION PER-
CEPTIONS (CSES 2001-2006) AND CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX (TI). 
 
 
Source: CSES module 2 and Transparency International 2012, taken from Teorell et. al., 2013.  
Comment: Portugal occurs twice in the graph since both the 2002 and 2005 election is included in the CSES dataset. The 
Portugal observation on the line is the 2002 election and the Portugal observation below the line is the 2005 election. Please note 
that the corruption perception variable has been reversed, i.e. high values = less perceived political corruption. 
 
 
FIGURE 3, CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS BY COUNTRY (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS, 
CSES) 
 
 
Source: CSES module 2. Comment: Lower scores indicates less/no political corruption.  
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TABLE 1, CORRUPTION AND TURNOUT (UNSTANDARDIZED LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS, RANDOM 
EFFECTS MODELS), TEST OF DIFFERENT SYSTEM LEVEL VARIABLES. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Corruption assessments  -0.359*** -0.359*** -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.369*** -0.372*** -0.374*** -0.360*** -0.368*** -0.369*** 
 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Sex 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.076 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Age 0.491*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.491*** 0.489*** 0.490*** 0.487*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 
 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Education 0.401*** 0.397*** 0.402*** 0.404*** 0.400*** 0.404*** 0.397*** 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 
 
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Marital status 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Employed 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.064 0.067 0.063 0.065 0.065 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Income 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.297*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Political knowledge 0.909*** 0.906*** 0.908*** 0.906*** 0.906*** 0.907*** 0.903*** 0.909*** 0.907*** 0.907*** 
 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Party identification 0.665*** 0.666*** 0.664*** 0.662*** 0.666*** 0.664*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.665*** 0.664*** 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
 
1.955*** 1.956*** 1.956*** 1.955*** 1.955*** 1.956*** 1.956*** 1.955*** 1.956*** 1.956*** 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
 
-0.202*** -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.200*** -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.201*** 
 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Internal efficacy  -0.471*** -0.472*** -0.471*** -0.470*** -0.471*** -0.470*** -0.471*** -0.472*** -0.470*** -0.470*** 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
External efficacy 0.647*** 0.645*** 0.647*** 0.649*** 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.644*** 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.647*** 
 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Corruption politicized -1.071** 
         
 
(0.479) 
         
Global corruption perception index (ti)  
 
-1.479** 
        
  
(0.692) 
        
Proportional electoral system 
  
-0.754 
       
   
(0.926) 
       
Compulsory voting 
   
1.590* 
      
    
(0.888) 
      
Effective number of parties 
    
0.206 
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(0.143) 
     
Unicameralism 
     
-0.498 
    
      
(0.483) 
    
Electoral closeness 
      
0.007 
   
       
(0.009) 
   
GDP/capita 
       
0.000** 
  
        
(0.000) 
  
GDP/capita growth 
        
-0.009 
 
         
(0.016) 
 
Population (thousands) 
         
0.000 
          
(0.000) 
 
-0.803*** -1.376*** -0.400 -1.236*** -1.977*** -0.864** -1.151*** -2.435*** -0.990*** -1.176*** 
  (0.295) (0.296) (0.903) (0.279) (0.670) (0.363) (0.304) (0.671) (0.338) (0.367) 
  26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 26,650 
  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
